By Jim Hodgson

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution last week that authorizes deployment of 5,500 troops to Haiti to replace the understaffed and underfunded Multinational Security Support Mission (referred to as MMAS in Haiti). The new Gang Suppression Force (FRG) has a mandate to “neutralize, isolate, and deter” gangs, secure infrastructure, and support institutional stability.

---

Politico called the vote to create the FRG a “win” for the Trump administration. That alone should raise concern among the rest of us.

The UNSC decision came days after a police-directed drone attack on an alleged gang leader’s birthday party, where he was handing out presents to local children. At least eight children were killed.

Since June 2024, Haiti has been governed by a transitional council (CPT). Leadership rotates among a wobbly coalition from different sectors of Haitian society. It includes the civil society-led  Montana Accord network (named for the hotel where their accord was signed). Earlier, the Montana group had offered a “passarelle” or series of steps for an interim government as a way to move to new elections. (The terms of all Haitian politicians expired in 2023.) The CPT might have been able to move forward on that process, but Haiti is afflicted by a rising tide of gang violence that some argue is at least partly driven by Haiti’s richest people. 

In August, leadership of the CPT passed to Laurent Saint-Cyr, a former head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Haiti. At the same time, the prime minister is his fellow businessman Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.

To my suspicious mind, this means Haiti has returned to the same power structure that prevailed after 2011 under presidents Michel Martelly and Jovenel Moïse, and then the unelected leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Henry through early 2024 – men all backed by the United States, Canada, France and a powerful local oligarchy that has blocked every effort to ease Haiti’s inequality and to advance social goals, including education, health care, housing and public infrastructure. 

(Bear with me, please: you can read more of my own analysis towards the end of this piece.)

First, the news

According to the UN, at least 1.3 million Haitians remain internally displaced due to violence, with 5.7 million facing food insecurity. About 3,100 people were killed in violent incidents between January and June this year, and at least 2,300 grave violations against children have been recorded.

The UNSC resolution to create the Gang Suppression Force (known as FRG in French: Force de Répression des Gangs) was proposed in August by Panama and the United States. The resolution passed Sept. 30 with 12 votes in favour and none against. Permanent Security Council members China and Russia, along with rotating member Pakistan, abstained from the vote.

It replaces the MMAS, created just two years ago by the UN to support Haitian police forces, but never adequately funded. The new force would raise the personnel ceiling from 2,500 in the current mission to 5,550 personnel will grow from 2,500 to 5,550 personnel, with a UN Support Office providing logistical support amidst Haiti’s intersecting security, humanitarian, and political crises. But it will not be answerable to any Haitian authority, not even the Haitian National Police. 

Currently, it appears the new FRG would include the United States, Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Kenya—in effect a reboot of the MMAS.

Responses

Approval of the FRG was welcomed by the Caribbean regional group CARICOM, and the Organization of American States – even though the new OAS secretary-general, Albert Ramdin, had in June advocated dialogue with the gangs. That idea was rejected by the CPT. 

The Canadian government had earlier announced contribute $60 million toward gang-suppression efforts in Haiti. Mark Richardson, a Global Affairs Canada director general for the Caribbean, recently told the House of Commons foreign affairs committee that it is “too early” to have conversations about whether Canadian troops would be part of the new UN mission.

After the UN vote, U.S. Ambassador Henry Wooster pressed the CPT to hold elections:

• 🕊️ Context: follows the UN Security Council’s green light for the deployment of the Gang Repression Force (FRG).
• 🇺🇸 U.S. position: call for a clear plan and timetable for free and credible elections in Haiti.
• 🧭 Stated objective: to prevent the transition from dragging on and to encourage the restoration of democratic institutions.
• ⚖️ Political challenge: Washington wants to link security stabilization to an inclusive and supervised electoral process.
• 🕰️ Next steps: consultations between the Haitian government and international partners on implementation of the FRG and of an electoral timetable.

More critical views are offered by the Haïti Liberté newspaper. One article describes the rationale offered by China and Russia for not vetoing the resolution. It adds that Guyana, Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia sought to insert language that called for “full respect for the sovereignty and political independence of Haiti,” but their proposal was rejected by the U.S. Denmark, Greece, South Korea, and Slovenia “advocated for strengthening the text with language on compliance with international law, including international human rights law,” but “the US apparently consistently supplemented these additions with the qualifier ‘as applicable’.”

The same article quotes Haïti Liberté director Berthony Dupont questioning proposed use of the UN regular budget for operational and logistical support of this force. 

“In the context of the [UN]’s financial crisis, caused largely by the irresponsible actions of its largest contributor [the U.S.], expecting significant funding to support a new initiative that exists only on paper, and which lacks a sustainable foundation and clear prospects, is naive, to say the least. Let us put it straight: if that contributor failed to provide the funds it promised for the MMAS, what guarantee do we have that anything will be different this time?”

In Port-au-Prince, the human rights group Collectif Défenseurs Plus told Alterpresse that it recognizes that “international assistance has become inevitable” in the face of an overwhelmed HNP and unprecedented violence. But it demands guarantees: accessible accountability mechanisms, zero tolerance for any human rights violations, and uncompromising support for Haitian institutions.

“The Haitian crisis is above all political,” the collective insists, warning that the FRG must not become a crutch for a power lacking legitimacy, but rather create a space for an inclusive transition and transparent elections.

Between hopes for restored security and fears of another international failure, the success of the FRG will depend as much on its ability to break the criminal grip as on the will of Haitian actors to rebuild a credible state. As the Defenders Plus Collective emphasizes, “security is a right, and so is sovereignty.”

How might Haiti be better served?

“While it is important to address the consequences of gang violence, influential foreign actors in Haiti should do more to address its root causes,” writes Roromme Chantal, a political science professor at l’Université de Moncton. 

“To this end, research demonstrates that conflict resolution such as the one in Haiti should be approached in a manner that allows for the participation of local groups (official authorities, civil society representatives, grassroots organizations), providing them, if necessary, with the funding, logistical means, and technical capacity to implement carefully targeted programs.”

My thoughts

I find myself thinking again of anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot. He wrote a book called State Against Nationin the years following the end of the Duvalier dictatorship. He argued that the Haitian state is relatively autonomous from the nation: all problems are turned into political problems, but the state – much less the political class – is not the same as the society. If we listen, we may find that the Haitian people have a project that is different from that imagined in the proposed solutions that focus too narrowly on the state. In another book, Silencing the Past, he argued that historical narratives are often silenced: even the truth about Haiti’s revolution, history’s most successful slave rebellion that made Haiti the “first nation to embrace an equity and human rights approach by permanently banning the slave trade from the first day of its existence.”

If anyone were listening, they might find that Haitians are more interested in communal solutions and local democracy. This would be something more akin to the “mandar obedeciendo” (to rule by obeying the bases, the grassroots) advocated by the Zapatistas in southern Mexico than whatever Haitian elites and their neoliberal allies abroad are proposing, which seems a lot like “duvalierisme sans Duvalier” – reproduction of a totalitarian state, a predator state: one that is safe only for the rich.