Our season of fire

by Jim Hodgson

Summerland – both my hometown and the site of my so-called “retirement” – made national and global headlines over the past 10 days because of that ultra-fast-moving wildfire that ignited just west of town on Friday evening, August 7.

The fire, frightening as it was and devastating as it is for those who lost homes and jobs because of it, brought out the best among neighbours: from the first minutes, people helped each other. Soon, residents of Penticton and other communities welcomed 20,000 evacuees from Summerland, Peachland and the smaller communities like Faulder and Meadow Valley to the west. I am grateful to neighbours, first responders, and the fire-fighters who came from near and far (gracias, México!) to help control the fire. I’ll say a bit more about my situation below.

Over the summer, I had been pondering the concept of development as I have been using it in my Unwrapping Development blog posts – mostly the international sort that attempts (and often fails) to improve livelihoods in less-privileged parts of the world – and the way the word development gets bandied around in local, provincial and Canadian politics.

By way of illustration, I was going to write about a conflict over a proposed gravel pit mine in Garnet Valley, the northwest part of Summerland. In July, the provincial government of British Columbia re-ignited public debate over the gravel pit. Those of us who opposed the proposal thought we had won when a B.C. Supreme Court judge quashed it in February.

But no. It seems provincial mining laws can override opposition from the municipal council, the regional district (like a county in other places), residents, the Okanagan Nation Alliance and the Penticton Indian Band.

Garnet Valley, like nearby Prairie Valley, Cartwright Mountain and the mountains between Garnet Vally and Okanagan Lake, suffered still-not fully known damage in the recent fire. But the human and ecological concerns about the proposed gravel pit remain. Over time, plants and trees will grow again, and wildlife return. Better, however, with no gravel pit!

Our journey

David and I had left Summerland Wednesday, Aug. 5 before the fire for a visit to Ottawa. When the fire erupted, we talked about whether to try to return early or not. We chose to remain in Ottawa until our scheduled return Tuesday, Aug. 10. By then, it was clear to us that we needed to go back.

Getting there, however, turned into our own Odyssey, or as David called it, our own Amazing Race Canada. Our flights were cancelled, re-scheduled, and cancelled again because of heavy smoke at Kelowna airport. We talked the airline into taking us as far as Calgary, thinking that then we could rent a car and drive to Kelowna, retrieve our car there, and then drive on to Penticton to re-connect with family and retrieve our cat. 

“Life is what happens while you’re busy making other plans,” as John Lennon sang, and no sooner than the new flights were confirmed, car rented and motel room booked, the plans fell apart. Avis became my Cyclops, and hotels.com my Poseidon. I eventually won both battles, however, and we were able to buy (expensive) tickets on a late-night flight from Calgary to Kelowna. We got the car back and spent the night in a motel in East Kelowna. 

The next day, we made the long detour to Penticton, arriving their mid-afternoon. We got ourselves sorted out with the good people of B.C. Emergency Support Services, recovered our cat Chia, and settled into a hotel in Oliver.

This of course is a story very different from those of people I know who survived the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, or the more recent earthquakes in Venezuela and Colombia. Mine were, as we sometimes joke, first-world problems. We have enough money to absorb some stupid mistakes; we have insurance; we have governments capable of providing assistance.

When I write about development, it has to included capacity for disaster-response just as it must respect the principle of subsidiarity (prominent in Catholic social teaching): community challenges should be handled by the most local authority possible. A higher authority should only assist, support, or coordinate when a lower group cannot do the job alone.

We have a home to go back to and we’ll work with others to clean up and where necessary, re-build. And, more than ever, we must evoke ecological concerns about development. What we do in the name of development continues to affect the climate. Every summer is becoming a season of dread.

Canada-Ecuador free trade deal sparks concern in both countries

by Jim Hodgson

As ministers signed a new free trade agreement today in Ottawa, civil society organizations in Canada and Ecuador repeated their concerns about the deal.

The 26-chapter document was signed in Ottawa today by Canada’s international trade minister, Maninder Sidhu and Ecuador’s minister of production, foreign trade and investment, Luis Alberto Jaramillo.

Ministers meet. Photo: Primicias, Ecuador.

In Canada, Common Frontiers and MiningWatch Canada said the agreement was “deeply dangerous.” From what is known about the deal, it’s clear that it “grants sweeping and undemocratic protections to Canadian investors while deepening Ecuador’s human rights crisis.”

(I have worked with both organizations and their members for the better part of three decades – since our struggles over the North American FTA, opposition to the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas – a fight we won in 2005 – and the impacts of Canadian mining companies in Guatemala and beyond. Challenging as the current situation in Ecuador is, I am pleased to see Common Frontiers and MiningWatch fighting the good fight against these FTAs that only benefit the rich.)

Groups in both countries had previously criticized Ecuador’s ban on its largest opposition party, ongoing criminalization of ecological defenders, failure to consult with Indigenous peoples, and collaboration with the United States in military attacks on supposed drug-traffickers.

Common Frontiers and MiningWatch prepared a four-page explainer on why the deal is bad. And here is a statement on the new FTA from colleagues at Latin America is Better without Free Trade.

Most of what follows is text from the Common Frontiers-MiningWatch news release:

Minister Sidhu said the agreement will “open new opportunities for Canadian companies in a growing market, strengthen supply chains, and provide more predictable access to goods, services, and investment.” But Canada’s own assessment of the agreement projected insignificant growth in trade. Its main purpose is to attract and protect Canadian investment in Ecuador’s mining sector. 

The agreement is massively opposed by a large share of Ecuadorian civil society and Indigenous groups.

Paramount among the concerns:

  • A worsening human rights crisis in Ecuador. Ecuadorian and international human rights organizations have documented widespread, systematic human rights violations, including increasing militarization, repression of dissent, the criminalization of environmental defenders, and the imposition of executive decrees that undermine the rule of law. Much of this is exacerbated by – or in support of – existing Canadian mining investment in the country.
  • No consultation, consent, or transparency. The agreement was negotiated and signed without the free, prior, and informed consent of affected Indigenous Peoples, violating the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Ecuador’s obligations under the Escazú Agreement.
  • Investor protections that violate Ecuador’s constitution. The agreement contains an Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanism that is prohibited by Ecuador’s constitution and was rejected in two recent plebiscites. According to former UN Rapporteur David Boyd, ISDS poses “catastrophic” consequences for climate action, environmental protection, and the realization of human rights.
  • No corporate accountability mechanism in Canada. The recent closure of the Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (CORE) and the lack of due diligence legislation underscore a major accountability gap in Canada. Communities harmed by the operations of Canadian companies in Ecuador will have no standing in investor-state disputes and nowhere to turn for justice and remedy.

The agreement now heads to Parliament to be ratified. In response to repeated concerns raised by Ecuadorian civil society and Indigenous communities and echoed by prominent civil society voices in Canada, the organizations are urging Members of Parliament to reject the agreement.

In Ecuador, the Primicias news site said the trade agreement with Canada will allow almost all of the products that Ecuador exports to that market to enter with zero tariff, once it comes into force. According to the Government, the benefit covers 99.6% of items for Ecuador.

Among the products that will enter without paying tariffs are: textiles, vegetables, roses, sardines, confetti, chocolate and ceramics.

Likewise, some of the products imported from Canada that will reach Ecuador without paying tariffs, including: wheat, cell phones, cleaning products, laptops, drones, fertilizers, medicines and sporting goods.

On the use and misuse of sanctions in a time of empire

by Jim Hodgson

Venezuela’s catastrophic double-tap earthquake on June 24 raises yet again the issues that surround use of sanctions and their humanitarian consequences.

Forgive me for repeating myself, but most sanctions – “unilateral coercive measures” – are almost exclusively applied by rich northern countries against less-wealthy southern countries.

See Common Dreams, July 7, 2026

Venezuela’s drama plays out in the context of historic U.S. refusal to accept the development in this hemisphere of a political and economic model other than the capitalist one. At the end of 1998, Venezuelans chose Hugo Chávez to be their president because he represented a shift away from an oligarchy that used the country’s oil wealth for its own benefit and some allies in an aspiring middle class. In 2004, the United States backed a coup attempt against Chávez: it failed.

Since 2005, U.S. administrations have made annual determination that Venezuela has “failed demonstrably to adhere to its obligations under international narcotics agreements.” The United States began applying sanctions in 2006, saying that Venezuela was not cooperating fully with anti-terrorism efforts, and prohibited all U.S. commercial arms sales and retransfers to Venezuela.

Persistent U.S. action against Venezuela began after the death of Chávez in 2013. His successor, Nicolás Maduro, was perceived as less charismatic (and in the U.S. view, therefore less popular) than Chávez. Oil prices, moreover, had collapsed in 2009, rose again between 2012 and 2014, and collapsed again in 2015. Maduro seemed more vulnerable to external pressure.

Days before Christmas in December 2014, the U.S. Congress voted to give the United States the right to intervene in Venezuela “in defense of democracy and civil society.” Members of congress justified themselves by citing the need to defend “peaceful Venezuelan protesters,” alluding to protests that left 43 people dead. That “defense of civil society” law established the legal framework and paved the way for future sanctions against Venezuela.

These and other measures have been strengthened since 2015. They include a prohibition on use of currencies issued by the Venezuelan government, seizures of accounts and material goods owned by the Venezuelan state and the state-owned oil company and its subsidiaries, and measures against “third parties,” targeting companies that provide services to the Venezuelan state (including transportation of oil). 

Three months later, President Barack Obama cited that law as he issued a presidential decree declaring Venezuela an “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States,” and launching what would become a program of more than 1,000 unilateral coercive measures: sanctions.

Assets of Venezuela’s national oil company, PDVSA, including its U.S. subsidiary, CITGO, were eventually blocked or seized, preventing the companies from renegotiating international commitments or attracting new investment. Venezuela went from receiving $39 billion in foreign earnings in 2014 to receiving $743 million in 2020. Measures taken during the first Trump administration led to Venezuela’s effective exclusion from international banking (including SWIFT).

Assets held abroad were confiscated by the United States and handed over to a fake government led by an opposition politician, Juan Guaidó, for whom nobody had voted and yet was backed by Canada and a handful of Latin American countries called the Lima Group.

A variety of situations show limits and possibilities of sanctions. Their use is said to be a “stick in the diplomatic toolkit,”[1] alongside others like dialogue, human rights protection, democracy promotion, mediation, or election observation. For decades after World War II, sanctions were applied by international organizations like the United Nations or the African Union against a member.

After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the UN Security Council used sanctions with mixed success in Yugoslavia and Africa—and also to tragic effect against Iraq in the 1990s. More recently, unilateral sanctions applied by individual states or groups of states against non-members have become more common—and denunciations of their illegality have become louder.

Critics see sanctions as a neocolonial tool available only to powerful states, and one that should be removed from the kit permanently. Indeed, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are a combination of historic colonial powers and contemporary super-powers that are repeatedly accused of threatening or interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Moreover, sharp differences among the permanent five have made it more difficult both to impose new multilateral sanctions and to ease existing ones.

Currently, the Venezuelan Anti-Blockade Observatory has documented approximately 930 active sanctions against hundreds of individuals, companies, aircraft, and vessels. A recent article in TeleSUR documents the impact of the sanctions on earthquake recovery efforts.

In a July 7 piece for Just Security, a pair of experts—George Lopez, professor emeritus of peace studies at the University of Notre Dame, and Venezuelan economist and Francisco Rodríguez of the Center for Economic Policy and Research (CEPR)—noted that post-earthquakes, “the United States pledged $300 million to relief agencies, mobilized civilian and military teams to Venezuela that are trained on disaster relief, and issued a limited sanctions waiver for earthquake relief activities.

“But these measures are far from enough,” they stressed, explaining that “the United Nations estimates the losses from the quakes stand at $37 billion,” or 32 per cent of Venezuela’s gross domestic product.

Even The New York Times can see the enormous gap between the U.S. relief offer and the billions of dollars in Venezuelan assets it controls.

Calls to end the sanctions on Venezuela are not new: the damage has been felt for more than a decade. In 2020, more than 40 churches and ecumenical organizations in Latin America and the Caribbean signed a letter calling for an end to U.S. sanctions. “These strategies will not serve any purpose other than to harm those who are already suffering, and who are the most vulnerable to COVID-19. The economic sanctions will also negatively affect the political and social environments needed for a peaceful solution to the crisis in Venezuela.”

That letter followed a statement the previous month from the U.S. National Council of Churches that condemned any possible military intervention in Venezuela and urged elimination of all economic sanctions. It also called on the global ecumenical movement to oppose intervention and sanctions, and to affirm Venezuela’s right to self-determination and sovereignty.

These issues were taken up again by the World Council of Churches and its Commission on International Affairs in a July 16 webinar.

“From the standpoint of international law, interventions such as those perpetrated by the Russian federation in Ukraine and by the U.S. in Venezuela raise serious concerns,” said Peter Prove, director of the commission. “For the WCC, such illegal violations are also theological and ethical violations.” The webinar can be viewed here.

[1] Michael Nesbitt, “Canada’s ‘Unilateral’ Sanctions Regime Under Review: Extraterritoriality, Human Rights, Due Process, and Enforcement in Canada’s Special Economic Measures Act,” (2017), 48-2 Ottawa Law Review 509, CanLIIDocs 119: https://canlii.ca/t/71w.