Category Archives: Haiti

UN approves a ‘Gang Suppression Force’ for Haiti

By Jim Hodgson

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution last week that authorizes deployment of 5,500 troops to Haiti to replace the understaffed and underfunded Multinational Security Support Mission (referred to as MMAS in Haiti). The new Gang Suppression Force (FRG) has a mandate to “neutralize, isolate, and deter” gangs, secure infrastructure, and support institutional stability.

On Aug. 26, UN Secretary General António Guterres warned that humanitarian efforts in Haiti are “shamefully overlooked and woefully underfunded.” On Sept. 30, Volker Türk, the UN high commissioner for human rights, welcomed creation of the FRG and said: “Efforts to restore security must be anchored in respect for human rights and go hand in hand with the reconstruction of the rule of law.”

Politico called the vote to create the FRG a “win” for the Trump administration. That alone should raise concern among the rest of us.

The UNSC decision came days after a police-directed drone attack on an alleged gang leader’s birthday party, where he was handing out presents to local children. At least eight children were killed.

Since June 2024, Haiti has been governed by a transitional council (CPT). Leadership rotates among a wobbly coalition from different sectors of Haitian society. It includes the civil society-led  Montana Accord network (named for the hotel where their accord was signed). Earlier, the Montana group had offered a “passarelle” or series of steps for an interim government as a way to move to new elections. (The terms of all Haitian politicians expired in 2023.) The CPT might have been able to move forward on that process, but Haiti is afflicted by a rising tide of gang violence that some argue is at least partly driven by Haiti’s richest people. 

In August, leadership of the CPT passed to Laurent Saint-Cyr, a former head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Haiti. At the same time, the prime minister is his fellow businessman Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.

To my suspicious mind, this means Haiti has returned to the same power structure that prevailed after 2011 under presidents Michel Martelly and Jovenel Moïse, and then the unelected leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Henry through early 2024 – men all backed by the United States, Canada, France and a powerful local oligarchy that has blocked every effort to ease Haiti’s inequality and to advance social goals, including education, health care, housing and public infrastructure. 

(Bear with me, please: you can read more of my own analysis towards the end of this piece.)

First, the news

According to the UN, at least 1.3 million Haitians remain internally displaced due to violence, with 5.7 million facing food insecurity. About 3,100 people were killed in violent incidents between January and June this year, and at least 2,300 grave violations against children have been recorded.

The UNSC resolution to create the Gang Suppression Force (known as FRG in French: Force de Répression des Gangs) was proposed in August by Panama and the United States. The resolution passed Sept. 30 with 12 votes in favour and none against. Permanent Security Council members China and Russia, along with rotating member Pakistan, abstained from the vote.

It replaces the MMAS, created just two years ago by the UN to support Haitian police forces, but never adequately funded. The new force would raise the personnel ceiling from 2,500 in the current mission to 5,550 personnel will grow from 2,500 to 5,550 personnel, with a UN Support Office providing logistical support amidst Haiti’s intersecting security, humanitarian, and political crises. But it will not be answerable to any Haitian authority, not even the Haitian National Police. 

Currently, it appears the new FRG would include the United States, Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Kenya—in effect a reboot of the MMAS.

Memories of a previous UN intervention: UN trucks parked near Cap-Haïtien in February 2005 (Jim Hodgson photo).

Responses

Approval of the FRG was welcomed by the Caribbean regional group CARICOM, and the Organization of American States – even though the new OAS secretary-general, Albert Ramdin, had in June advocated dialogue with the gangs. That idea was rejected by the CPT. 

The Canadian government had earlier announced contribute $60 million toward gang-suppression efforts in Haiti. Mark Richardson, a Global Affairs Canada director general for the Caribbean, recently told the House of Commons foreign affairs committee that it is “too early” to have conversations about whether Canadian troops would be part of the new UN mission.

After the UN vote, U.S. Ambassador Henry Wooster pressed the CPT to hold elections:

  • 🕊️ Context: follows the UN Security Council’s green light for the deployment of the Gang Repression Force (FRG).
  • 🇺🇸 U.S. position: call for a clear plan and timetable for free and credible elections in Haiti.
  • 🧭 Stated objective: to prevent the transition from dragging on and to encourage the restoration of democratic institutions.
  • ⚖️ Political challenge: Washington wants to link security stabilization to an inclusive and supervised electoral process.
  • 🕰️ Next steps: consultations between the Haitian government and international partners on implementation of the FRG and of an electoral timetable.

More critical views are offered by the Haïti Liberté newspaper. One article describes the rationale offered by China and Russia for not vetoing the resolution. It adds that Guyana, Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia sought to insert language that called for “full respect for the sovereignty and political independence of Haiti,” but their proposal was rejected by the U.S. Denmark, Greece, South Korea, and Slovenia “advocated for strengthening the text with language on compliance with international law, including international human rights law,” but “the US apparently consistently supplemented these additions with the qualifier ‘as applicable’.”

The same article quotes Haïti Liberté director Berthony Dupont questioning proposed use of the UN regular budget for operational and logistical support of this force. 

“In the context of the [UN]’s financial crisis, caused largely by the irresponsible actions of its largest contributor [the U.S.], expecting significant funding to support a new initiative that exists only on paper, and which lacks a sustainable foundation and clear prospects, is naive, to say the least. Let us put it straight: if that contributor failed to provide the funds it promised for the MMAS, what guarantee do we have that anything will be different this time?”

In Port-au-Prince, the human rights group Collectif Défenseurs Plus told Alterpresse that it recognizes that “international assistance has become inevitable” in the face of an overwhelmed HNP and unprecedented violence. But it demands guarantees: accessible accountability mechanisms, zero tolerance for any human rights violations, and uncompromising support for Haitian institutions.

“The Haitian crisis is above all political,” the collective insists, warning that the FRG must not become a crutch for a power lacking legitimacy, but rather create a space for an inclusive transition and transparent elections.

Between hopes for restored security and fears of another international failure, the success of the FRG will depend as much on its ability to break the criminal grip as on the will of Haitian actors to rebuild a credible state. As the Defenders Plus Collective emphasizes, “security is a right, and so is sovereignty.”

How might Haiti be better served?

“While it is important to address the consequences of gang violence, influential foreign actors in Haiti should do more to address its root causes,” writes Roromme Chantal, a political science professor at l’Université de Moncton. 

“To this end, research demonstrates that conflict resolution such as the one in Haiti should be approached in a manner that allows for the participation of local groups (official authorities, civil society representatives, grassroots organizations), providing them, if necessary, with the funding, logistical means, and technical capacity to implement carefully targeted programs.”

My thoughts

I find myself thinking again of anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot. He wrote a book called State Against Nationin the years following the end of the Duvalier dictatorship. He argued that the Haitian state is relatively autonomous from the nation: all problems are turned into political problems, but the state – much less the political class – is not the same as the society. If we listen, we may find that the Haitian people have a project that is different from that imagined in the proposed solutions that focus too narrowly on the state. In another book, Silencing the Past, he argued that historical narratives are often silenced: even the truth about Haiti’s revolution, history’s most successful slave rebellion that made Haiti the “first nation to embrace an equity and human rights approach by permanently banning the slave trade from the first day of its existence.”

If anyone were listening, they might find that Haitians are more interested in communal solutions and local democracy. This would be something more akin to the “mandar obedeciendo” (to rule by obeying the bases, the grassroots) advocated by the Zapatistas in southern Mexico than whatever Haitian elites and their neoliberal allies abroad are proposing, which seems a lot like “duvalierisme sans Duvalier” – reproduction of a totalitarian state, a predator state: one that is safe only for the rich.

Drone attacks in the Caribbean have Canadian connections

By Jim Hodgson

Separate incidents of use of explosive drones by the U.S. military to attack alleged Venezuelan drug-traffickers and by Haitian police to attack local gang leaders may have Canadian connections.

The Canadian ecumenical coalition Project Ploughshares reported Monday (Oct. 6) that a Canadian-made high-tech camera system was used to attack two boats that the United States said were carrying drugs. CBC News analysed the Ploughshares report, compared it to product manuals and previously released videos and spoke with former military and defence industry experts, concluding that it is highly likely Canadian tech was involved in surveillance during the operations.

Project Ploughshares and CBC reports on the U.S. attacks and their Canadian connection. The full Ploughshares report is here.

“There has to be more human rights oversight,” said Kelsey Gallagher, a senior researcher with Project Ploughshares. “We are seeing Canadian weapons being misused.” Founded in 1976, Project Ploughshares is the peace research institute of the Canadian Council of Churches. 

Global Affairs Canada told CBC that it is “aware of the U.S. operation and is monitoring the situation.”

The United States has said it used drones three times to attack boats it alleges were carrying drugs, but provided no evidence of drug-trafficking. The Ploughshares report shows that the U.S. military used a Canadian-made L3Harris WESCAM MX-Series sensor system for tracking and surveillance of boats that were struck as they sailed from Venezuela in the first two of three strikes reported last month.

Drone attack in Haiti’s capital kills 8 children

Meanwhile, a police-directed drone strike on a birthday party in Port-au-Prince that killed at least nine people (most of them children) and wounded 17 others has drawn attention to drones provided to Haiti by Canada. 

The explosions happened Sept. 20 in Cité Soleil, a large, impoverished neighbourhood controlled by Viv Ansanm, a powerful coalition of criminal gangs that the U.S. has designated as a foreign terrorist organization.

Al Jazeera news service said the drones used in the operation were supplied by Canadian police. Successive Canadian governments have long maintained programs of assistance and training to Haitian police. 

Months earlier, Global Affairs Canada told CBC that it was “concerned” about reports of extrajudicial executions, a violation of international human rights law. GAC did not clarify if Ottawa knew of cases in which Canadian-provided drones had been used for lethal purposes in Haiti. It said Haiti had agreed that the equipment provided would not be used “to commit or facilitate any violation of international humanitarian law or international human rights law.”

On Oct. 2, UN Human Rights Commissioner Volker Türk said Haiti’s use of lethal force against gangs was disproportionate and likely unlawful.

Volker Türk (left); Google News headlines in June regarding Erik Prince and his new role in fighting the gangs of Haiti.

Speaking in Geneva to the UN Human Rights Council, Türk said police units had summarily executed 174 people for alleged gang affiliation this year while government drone strikes against alleged gang members in Port-au-Prince had killed at least 559 people to date, including 11 children.

“Most of these drone strikes are likely unlawful under international human rights law,” Türk added.

Canada is legally bound to ensure that its export of military goods does not contribute to violations of international law. Compared to ongoing controversy over Canada’s arms exports to Israel – often shipped via the United States – Canada’s indirect involvement in these drone incidents in the Caribbean may be relatively limited, but seem to reveal a pattern of disregard for human rights consequences of commercial deals in our neoliberal world.

In March this year, the Haitian government hired Vectus Global, a company run by Blackwater founder Erik Prince, to operate drones.

Two days after the drone strike on the birthday party, the UN Security Council approved a new Gang Suppression Force for Haiti. I’ll share more about that (and Canada’s contribution) in days ahead.

Dismantling USAID: Yes, No, Maybe?

In late 1980, more than a year after the triumph of the Sandinista Revolution, the administration of President Jimmy Carter was still funding infrastructure in Nicaragua through USAID. By November 1984, with President Ronald Reagan’s “Contra War” well underway, your future bloguista was amused by this left-over sign at a road rebuilt near Matagalpa.

by Jim Hodgson

Back on launch day of Trump 2.0, the president issued an executive order that suspended international aid programs for 90 days, including those of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

The move came with a lot of over-the-top rhetoric and outright lies: that USAID spent “$100 million on condoms to Hamas” and that it “bankrolled” the Politico digital news company. “It’s been run by a bunch of radical lunatics. And we’re getting them out,” Trump told reporters on the evening of Feb. 2.

There are, of course, dozens of issues about which to criticize the Trump regime. But this is a blog that sets out to unwrap development issues, so let’s get into it.

Congress established USAID in 1961 to bring together programs that were administering foreign aid. Focusing on long-term social and economic development, USAID disbursed about $72 billion in 2023, less than 1% of the U.S. annual budget. It is one of the largest aid agencies in the world. 

You’ll remember, of course, that the United Nations target for spending on Official Development Assistance is 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product. Only five countries meet or exceed that goal: Norway, Luxembourg, Sweden, Germany and Denmark. In 2023, Canada contributed 0.37 per cent of GDP; the United States contributed just 0.24 per cent, seventh lowest among 31 OECD countries. 

Trump’s order, carried out by his government efficiency hatchet-man, Elon Musk, chopped humanitarian programs around the world: famine relief in war zones; programs to stall malaria in 22 African nations; vaccinations in vulnerable areas; and access to medications by people living with HIV and AIDS. Several U.S. government websites also removed resources on HIV. (That also happened when Trump first took office in 2017).

Newsweek reported Feb. 6 that just months before Musk shut down USAID, the agency was investigating its relationship with Musk’s Starlink satellite company.

In days since the order, enough voices were raised in alarm to get funding for HIV and other essential medicines restored—though it wasn’t clear if that included preventative drugs like PrEP. For more than 20 years, PEPFAR (the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief) worked within and alongside the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria and the Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS).

Also, a federal judge on Feb. 7 temporarily blocked the administration from placing 2,200 USAID employees on paid leave, siding with workers who argued Trump and Musk lack the authority to immediately dismantle an agency created by congressional legislation.

The Trump regime blames “migrants” for much of what supposedly ails the United States, but in this time of unparalleled worldwide migration of people, the USAID cuts hit the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration (IOM)—two agencies that are critical in managing and measuring the flows of people.

No one should argue against humanitarian aid, although Musk and Republican members of congress who see empathy as a character flaw will do so. In a world still suffering from massive inequality, such aid is urgently needed. The U.S. Christian magazine Sojourners offered a strong defence of the humanitarian work of USAID.

What happens after the 90-day review? My guess is that some functions will be folded into the State Department and thus more susceptible to narrow political goals, like subversion of other countries’ governments. I feel badly for beneficiaries of the humanitarian programs and for many well-intentioned employees; not so much for the vast array of U.S.-based independent contractors who get rich from the misery of others.

Sheinbaum: “It’s better they close it”
As noted above, USAID was created in 1961—just two years after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution. There was no artifice: USAID was to counter the influence of Soviet Union. In recent years, USAID has been at the heart of U.S. challenges to the growing influence of China, which has a successful “Belt and Road” foreign aid program of its own.
My venerable Mac laptop computer tells me that I have 226 files that mention USAID. Almost all of the documents are about the ways that USAID is used as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, especially its work alongside other U.S. institutions that promote—or subvert—democracy in other countries: the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the International Republican Institute, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and even the Central Intelligence Agency.

USAID even had an Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) that gained infamy in 2014 over its covert “Cuban Twitter” (ZunZuneo) social media program that was aimed at overthrowing the Cuban government was revealed by Associated Press. 

Sheinbaum (left): USAID must be transparent; in Mexico, it has funded the opposition. Right: USAID still in the headlines Feb. 8.

In her morning news conference on Feb. 4, Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum, breaking away from the dispute over tariffs, lashed out at the overt political activity of USAID. “This agency has funded research projects and groups opposed to the government. That’s the case with Mexico.”
She mentioned an organization that she called, “Mexicans for Corruption.” (She was only half-joking: it’s Mexicans against Corruption. The group actively opposed her predecessor Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s effort to reform the judicial system, and it had support from USAID.) 
“And how is it that they get involved in politics, those agencies that are about aid. In that sense, if the United States wants to help with development, it should be transparent,” she continued.  “The truth is that there are so many things USAID does that in truth it is better they close it.”
In a similar vein, Colombian President Gustavo Petro said some U.S. help is not welcome and has to go. “Hundreds of immigration officials who guard our borders were paid by the United States. This aid is poison,” he said during a Feb. 3 cabinet meeting. “That should never be allowed. We are going to pay with our money.” In 2024, the agency paid nearly $385 million to Colombia.

Haïti chérie

Which brings me to Haiti, a country whose heartbreak I know well. For more than 45 years, it has been particularly afflicted by HIV and AIDS. The ongoing political crisis, worsened by uncontrolled activity by criminal gangs, continues to hamper relief efforts including support to people living with HIV and AIDS. 

Repeated U.S. interventions have made things worse. From 2011, with the presidencies of Michel Martellyand Jovenel Moïse and then the unelected leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Henry through early 2024, the United States and the local elites had the leaders they wanted: men close to the business sector who had close ties in the United States.

That fruitless model was finally shoved aside last June 11 with the installation of a transitional council (CPT). It’s wobbly but hope persists that it can finally organize new elections that produce leaders that Haitians want. A truth commission and an electoral council have been named.

In the meantime, the problem of gang violence is being addressed (though ineffectively) with the addition of the Multinational Security Support Mission (known as MMAS), led by police from Kenya and bolstered with police from El Salvador and Guatemala. Despite UN backing and many promises, it is underfunded and understaffed.

Feb. 4: U.S. aid to the security mission is frozen. Feb. 6: aid is renewed

A new blow came Feb. 4 when the UN announced that the shutdown of USAID meant funds for the MMAS were frozen. But two days later, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced that MMAS would be protected despite the USAID cut, adding to speculation that Rubio, Musk and Trump are not all operating from the same playbook.

In the wake of the axing of USAID, the best piece that I have read about its activities in Haiti is by a long-time observer, Jake Johnston of the Center for Economic Policy and Research (CEPR). At the end of a Feb. 4 essay about the agency’s work in Haiti, he writes:

The term “aid” encompasses many different things: humanitarian assistance and development programming, contracts and grants, support to local organizations and multimillion dollar contracts to DC-area firms. 

There are many parts of the US foreign aid industry that can and should be stopped or significantly reformed. But that doesn’t mean that shutting down USAID, or making its assistance even more overtly political by placing it under the umbrella of the State Department, is going to be a good thing, either in the short or long term. 

The reality is that, where foreign assistance is least effective, it is largely because it is designed to promote US interests rather than address the needs of those ostensibly on the receiving end. The changes announced by the Trump administration are not likely to truly disrupt US soft power abroad. If anything, it will make political interventionism an even more explicit aim of US foreign assistance.