Category Archives: Haiti

Haiti: “The biggest disgrace is indifference”

by Jim Hodgson

More than 42 years after my first visit to Haiti, I can’t disagree with that assessment. It was offered June 16 by UN secretary general António Guterres near the end of his one-day visit to Port-au-Prince.

The visit came 40 years after the fall of the Duvalier family dictatorship; 36 years after the election of a liberation-theology-inspired priest named Jean-Bertrand Aristide; 35 years after the first coup against him; 22 years after the second coup; 16 years after the earthquake killed at least 220,000 people; five years after the assassination of Haiti’s last elected president; and after a decade of still-surging gang violence in the capital city and beyond.

A week after the visit by Guterres, Canada’s Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand announced $35 million in new funding Tuesday for projects aimed at shoring up security and curbing violence in the Caribbean. Just $7.5 million was to support the Haitian National Police service’s fight against gang violence.

Now two-and-a-half months have passed since Guterres denounced indifference and Anand offered money. But by any measure, everything has gotten worse. 

Two events caught my attention over in recent days.

Gang coalition attacks Kenscoff

First was a vicious gang attack in Kenscoff, a farming community high in the mountains above Port-au-Prince. At least 47 people were killed, including five children. Fifty others were abducted, though six children and seven women in the group were later released. Many of those killed had sought refuge in a church compound at L’église de l’Arche de la Nouvelle Alliance.

Days later, Pope Leo XIV called for release of all remaining hostages. Bishop Pierre André Dumas of the diocese of Anse-à-Veau et Miragoâne called for more action from Haiti’s government to protect the population and to end impunity:

“Haiti cannot become an immense cemetery where we come now and then to leave flowers, recite our condolences and publish statements.”

Gang violence has displaced about 1.5 million people in Haiti, where at least 3,050 people were reported killed from January to June, according to U.N. statistics released Aug. 25.

My first visit to Kenscoff came during my first visit to Haiti in March 1984. In Kenscoff, the repression was blatant. Duvalier was still in power, and we watched as his militia, the infamous Tontons Macoutes, extorted payments from vendors in a market in Kenscoff. In subsequent years, I passed through Kenscoff during visits to a Methodist congregation in nearby Furcy and to a school in Duplan rebuilt after the 2010 earthquake. (Photo: Jim Hodgson)

The Trump regime’s assault on Haitians in the U.S.

The second matter that grabbed my attention is that the United States has abruptly ended the “temporary protected status” that had kept Haitian asylum-seekers in years since the earthquake from being deported. On Aug. 27, the Department of Homeland Security posted on social media: “Haiti TPS has been TERMINATED. Those with TPS are in our nation illegally. They have two options: LEAVE IMMEDIATELY or be DEPORTED.” Attached was a video of chained Black men and women being moved through the rain toward a waiting plane.

Historian Heather Cox Richardson wrote: “Officials at DHS chose to publish a video of Black people in chains that evoked the slave coffles of the Old South.”

That news came at around the time that Eleazar S. Fernandez, a theologian from the Philippines currently teaching in Minnesota, wrote an excellent appreciation of Haitians and their rebellion that ended slavery in 1804. When he posted the text on Facebook, however, it was met with vile, bot-driven racist attacks that recalled phrases used by Trump, Vance and others in the current U.S. regime to malign Haitians.

UN Security Council speeches reveal the failure of the international community

The UN Security Council held an emergency meeting about Haiti on Friday, Aug. 28. Like conversations about Gaza, Sudan or Somalia, the meeting only revealed failures.

Gotson Pierre, editor of Haiti’s Alterpresse news service, wrote: 

“Three years after authorization of an international mission intended to support the Haitian National Police action against the gangs, results remain largely insufficient when measured against announced objectives.”

After one failed effort (known as the Multinational Mission to Support Security, MMAS), the UN created the Gang Suppression Force (FRG). 

The intent was to deploy a force of 5,500 international members but, as Dominican foreign affairs minister Roberto Álvarez Gil told a UNSC meeting in July, barely 1,000 were on the ground. On the surface, the problem was logistical – insufficient aircraft to bring police from countries that had promised them (Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire and others) – but it shows the deeper problem of UN member-state arrears. As you might guess, the United States under Trump is the largest and most reluctant debtor.  And the United States seems to have plenty of aircraft that it uses for deportations all over the planet.

At the Aug. 28 meeting, UNSC members called for rapid deployment of the FRG forces, renewal of the FRG mandate in September, and for tighter enforcement of an arms embargo. 

Two other problems. As noted in the Drop Site report above, the humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate. Meanwhile, Haiti’s illegitimate interim government, headed now only by Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé after U.S.-led manoeuvres in January that removed the previous Transitional Presidential Council, is trying to hold general elections for the first time in more than a decade on Dec. 13. It has been registering voters in Port-au-Prince and beyond. 

But, given the history of U.S. interference (and worse) in Haiti over more than a century, my expectation is that such an election will have a low voter turnout and produce a new president who is favourable to U.S. security and business plans, much like those of Michel Martelly (2011-16) and Jovenel Moïse (2017 until his assassination on July 7, 2021). Again, the parties, popular organisations and social movements with different visions for Haiti will be shoved aside.

As Haiti’s transitional government comes to an end, the U.S. flexes its muscles

by Jim Hodgson

In April 2024, I welcomed the formation of Haiti’s transitional council (known as the CPT). It was the product of negotiations among a broad spectrum of Haitian political parties and civil society organizations, including the business sector.

Within a month, fractures that would block steps toward a new election became apparent. And efforts to create conditions for an election were undermined by a rapid and ongoing increase in neighbourhood-based gang violence – despite the presence of UN-backed soldiers and police.

The mandate of the CPT expired on Saturday, Feb. 7, which also happened to be the 40th anniversary of the fall of the Duvalier family dictatorship. 

The transition ceremony Feb. 7: Haitians are “anti-constitutionally governed” (AlterPresse)

A U.S. warship and two Coast Guard ships sit in the Port-au-Prince harbour and a military plane was on the ground at the international airport. As many as 1.4 million people are displaced by gang violence. The political in-fighting rages.

In moments like this, I try to look at a variety of media sources to understand what is going on. The one I trust most is AlterPresse, a civil society initiative that emerges from among the groups that have worked for decades for a better future for people afflicted by poverty and violence. Haitian elites and their neoliberal allies abroad, meanwhile, seem determined again to impose a new totalitarian state, which is a predator state (like that of Duvalier) safe only for the rich and their cronies.

In the absence of any elections, Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé (a businessman named to the post by the CPT in November 2024) will hold on to power beyond the CPT’s expiry. He will rule like former de facto Prime Minister Ariel Henry did from July 2021 through February 2024: a head-of-government without a head-of-state or Parliament. 

Accountability? Only to the foreign governments that have backed him: the United States, France and Canada.

Left: Statement by Foreign Affairs Minister Anita Anand. Right: Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils Aimé and Canadian ambassador to Haiti André François Giroux (Le Nouvelliste).

In several recent public statements, U.S. authorities affirmed their support for Fils-Aimé. He is presented as the key figure capable of ensuring institutional continuity. They particularly emphasize his role in building a Haiti that is “strong, prosperous, and free.”

But it is those ships in the Port-au-Prince harbour that remind Haitians that pleasant statements barely mask the history of U.S. hard power in Haiti. 

AlterPresse: strong signals from the United States and uncertainty about the transition in Haiti.

“The naval presence appears to provide the latest proof of Washington’s willingness to use the threat of force to shape politics in the Western Hemisphere,” Diego Da Rin, an analyst with the International Crisis Group, told AP News. Arrival of the ships comes during a months-long build-up of U.S. military force in the Caribbean – already used against Venezuela on Jan. 3. 

An essential historical overview

Gotson Pierre, editor at AlterPresse, wrote Feb. 5 (text is translated and lightly-edited for clarity and length):

For many observers, these developments cannot be understood without a historical overview of relations between Haiti and the United States. This history is marked by repeated interventions, both military and political.

From the occupation of 1915 to 1934, with its devastating human, economic, and institutional consequences, to the [interventions in 1994 and 2004], and including the massive deployment of troops in 2010 following the earthquake, the United States has played a central role in major Haitian crises. Added to this are non-military political interventions, notably during the 2010-2011 elections, and more recently, the case of former Prime Minister Ariel Henry.

Many analysts also believe that regional bodies such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Organization of American States (OAS) operate within a framework heavily influenced by Washington. 

Haiti maintains a complex relationship with the United States, characterized by geographical proximity, strategic interdependence, and asymmetrical power dynamics. This proximity … continues to influence the country’s political trajectory.

On the eve of February 7, 2026, amid institutional uncertainties, increased international pressure, and a reinforced military presence, the equation remains unresolved. The coming days will reveal whether these signs signal a simple continuation within established frameworks or a new phase of political realignment under strong external influence.

UN approves a ‘Gang Suppression Force’ for Haiti

By Jim Hodgson

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution last week that authorizes deployment of 5,500 troops to Haiti to replace the understaffed and underfunded Multinational Security Support Mission (referred to as MMAS in Haiti). The new Gang Suppression Force (FRG) has a mandate to “neutralize, isolate, and deter” gangs, secure infrastructure, and support institutional stability.

On Aug. 26, UN Secretary General António Guterres warned that humanitarian efforts in Haiti are “shamefully overlooked and woefully underfunded.” On Sept. 30, Volker Türk, the UN high commissioner for human rights, welcomed creation of the FRG and said: “Efforts to restore security must be anchored in respect for human rights and go hand in hand with the reconstruction of the rule of law.”

Politico called the vote to create the FRG a “win” for the Trump administration. That alone should raise concern among the rest of us.

The UNSC decision came days after a police-directed drone attack on an alleged gang leader’s birthday party, where he was handing out presents to local children. At least eight children were killed.

Since June 2024, Haiti has been governed by a transitional council (CPT). Leadership rotates among a wobbly coalition from different sectors of Haitian society. It includes the civil society-led  Montana Accord network (named for the hotel where their accord was signed). Earlier, the Montana group had offered a “passarelle” or series of steps for an interim government as a way to move to new elections. (The terms of all Haitian politicians expired in 2023.) The CPT might have been able to move forward on that process, but Haiti is afflicted by a rising tide of gang violence that some argue is at least partly driven by Haiti’s richest people. 

In August, leadership of the CPT passed to Laurent Saint-Cyr, a former head of the American Chamber of Commerce in Haiti. At the same time, the prime minister is his fellow businessman Alix Didier Fils-Aimé.

To my suspicious mind, this means Haiti has returned to the same power structure that prevailed after 2011 under presidents Michel Martelly and Jovenel Moïse, and then the unelected leadership of Prime Minister Ariel Henry through early 2024 – men all backed by the United States, Canada, France and a powerful local oligarchy that has blocked every effort to ease Haiti’s inequality and to advance social goals, including education, health care, housing and public infrastructure. 

(Bear with me, please: you can read more of my own analysis towards the end of this piece.)

First, the news

According to the UN, at least 1.3 million Haitians remain internally displaced due to violence, with 5.7 million facing food insecurity. About 3,100 people were killed in violent incidents between January and June this year, and at least 2,300 grave violations against children have been recorded.

The UNSC resolution to create the Gang Suppression Force (known as FRG in French: Force de Répression des Gangs) was proposed in August by Panama and the United States. The resolution passed Sept. 30 with 12 votes in favour and none against. Permanent Security Council members China and Russia, along with rotating member Pakistan, abstained from the vote.

It replaces the MMAS, created just two years ago by the UN to support Haitian police forces, but never adequately funded. The new force would raise the personnel ceiling from 2,500 in the current mission to 5,550 personnel will grow from 2,500 to 5,550 personnel, with a UN Support Office providing logistical support amidst Haiti’s intersecting security, humanitarian, and political crises. But it will not be answerable to any Haitian authority, not even the Haitian National Police. 

Currently, it appears the new FRG would include the United States, Bahamas, Canada, El Salvador, Guatemala, Jamaica, and Kenya—in effect a reboot of the MMAS.

Memories of a previous UN intervention: UN trucks parked near Cap-Haïtien in February 2005 (Jim Hodgson photo).

Responses

Approval of the FRG was welcomed by the Caribbean regional group CARICOM, and the Organization of American States – even though the new OAS secretary-general, Albert Ramdin, had in June advocated dialogue with the gangs. That idea was rejected by the CPT. 

The Canadian government had earlier announced contribute $60 million toward gang-suppression efforts in Haiti. Mark Richardson, a Global Affairs Canada director general for the Caribbean, recently told the House of Commons foreign affairs committee that it is “too early” to have conversations about whether Canadian troops would be part of the new UN mission.

After the UN vote, U.S. Ambassador Henry Wooster pressed the CPT to hold elections:

  • 🕊️ Context: follows the UN Security Council’s green light for the deployment of the Gang Repression Force (FRG).
  • 🇺🇸 U.S. position: call for a clear plan and timetable for free and credible elections in Haiti.
  • 🧭 Stated objective: to prevent the transition from dragging on and to encourage the restoration of democratic institutions.
  • ⚖️ Political challenge: Washington wants to link security stabilization to an inclusive and supervised electoral process.
  • 🕰️ Next steps: consultations between the Haitian government and international partners on implementation of the FRG and of an electoral timetable.

More critical views are offered by the Haïti Liberté newspaper. One article describes the rationale offered by China and Russia for not vetoing the resolution. It adds that Guyana, Algeria, Sierra Leone, and Somalia sought to insert language that called for “full respect for the sovereignty and political independence of Haiti,” but their proposal was rejected by the U.S. Denmark, Greece, South Korea, and Slovenia “advocated for strengthening the text with language on compliance with international law, including international human rights law,” but “the US apparently consistently supplemented these additions with the qualifier ‘as applicable’.”

The same article quotes Haïti Liberté director Berthony Dupont questioning proposed use of the UN regular budget for operational and logistical support of this force. 

“In the context of the [UN]’s financial crisis, caused largely by the irresponsible actions of its largest contributor [the U.S.], expecting significant funding to support a new initiative that exists only on paper, and which lacks a sustainable foundation and clear prospects, is naive, to say the least. Let us put it straight: if that contributor failed to provide the funds it promised for the MMAS, what guarantee do we have that anything will be different this time?”

In Port-au-Prince, the human rights group Collectif Défenseurs Plus told Alterpresse that it recognizes that “international assistance has become inevitable” in the face of an overwhelmed HNP and unprecedented violence. But it demands guarantees: accessible accountability mechanisms, zero tolerance for any human rights violations, and uncompromising support for Haitian institutions.

“The Haitian crisis is above all political,” the collective insists, warning that the FRG must not become a crutch for a power lacking legitimacy, but rather create a space for an inclusive transition and transparent elections.

Between hopes for restored security and fears of another international failure, the success of the FRG will depend as much on its ability to break the criminal grip as on the will of Haitian actors to rebuild a credible state. As the Defenders Plus Collective emphasizes, “security is a right, and so is sovereignty.”

How might Haiti be better served?

“While it is important to address the consequences of gang violence, influential foreign actors in Haiti should do more to address its root causes,” writes Roromme Chantal, a political science professor at l’Université de Moncton. 

“To this end, research demonstrates that conflict resolution such as the one in Haiti should be approached in a manner that allows for the participation of local groups (official authorities, civil society representatives, grassroots organizations), providing them, if necessary, with the funding, logistical means, and technical capacity to implement carefully targeted programs.”

My thoughts

I find myself thinking again of anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot. He wrote a book called State Against Nationin the years following the end of the Duvalier dictatorship. He argued that the Haitian state is relatively autonomous from the nation: all problems are turned into political problems, but the state – much less the political class – is not the same as the society. If we listen, we may find that the Haitian people have a project that is different from that imagined in the proposed solutions that focus too narrowly on the state. In another book, Silencing the Past, he argued that historical narratives are often silenced: even the truth about Haiti’s revolution, history’s most successful slave rebellion that made Haiti the “first nation to embrace an equity and human rights approach by permanently banning the slave trade from the first day of its existence.”

If anyone were listening, they might find that Haitians are more interested in communal solutions and local democracy. This would be something more akin to the “mandar obedeciendo” (to rule by obeying the bases, the grassroots) advocated by the Zapatistas in southern Mexico than whatever Haitian elites and their neoliberal allies abroad are proposing, which seems a lot like “duvalierisme sans Duvalier” – reproduction of a totalitarian state, a predator state: one that is safe only for the rich.